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Abstract 
This study provides an overview of UK infrastructure investment and finance in an international 
context, yielding interesting facts and insights for both investors and policy makers worldwide. 
The UK is one of the leading countries in terms of private sector involvement in infrastructure, 
with several decades’ experience in regulating privatized utilities and in developing public-
private partnerships (PPP). It has attracted substantial European and global capital, and London 
is a major market place for the infrastructure and green business. 
However, the UK has also seen decades of weak spending by the state (and taxpayers) on 
infrastructure. The country needs more investment when public budgets are already stretched. 
The question is whether private capital will be so easily available in future, especially from 
institutional and foreign investors. 
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1 Introduction 
This study provides an overview of the financing of infrastructure investment in the UK in a 
European, global and historical context. It evaluates the structure and development of private 
infrastructure finance in the UK, and makes comparisons with other advanced economies in the 
EU and the “G7+” (i.e. the G7 countries plus Australia). This broad, international perspective on a 
country at a critical point in its history yields useful insights for both policy makers and investors. 
The UK has been a leading country for private capital investments in infrastructure for several 
decades. In the 1980s, the UK pioneered the widespread privatisation of energy and water 
utilities as well as telecommunication, from which the UK model of regulated asset base (RAB) 
evolved. It is also seen as one of the most mature countries for public-private partnerships (PPP), 
especially in the form of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) for social infrastructure. 
At the same time, the UK gained a reputation for chronic under-investment in its economy and, 
in parts, also for poor infrastructure, especially in transport. Since the financial crisis and 
recession in 2007-2009, infrastructure has moved to the core of the political discussion, leading 
to various attempts to spur more investment. The government initially prioritised finding private 
sources of finance but there are signs of a change in policy sentiment towards higher public 
spending. 
This paper will discuss several key questions: How is the UK positioned in international 
comparison? What are the country’s experiences with private capital involvement in 
infrastructure? What is being done about the investment gap? Will the UK remain a favoured 
investment destination and financial market and business location?   
The paper takes a broad view on the evidence available and summarizes the key features of UK 
infrastructure. It is structured the following way. Section 2 provides a historical perspective on 
UK investment trends. Estimates for future infrastructure needs are reported in Section 3 while 
Section 4 looks at the state of UK infrastructure and its attractiveness for investment. Section 5 
summarises what is known about the ownership and control of UK infrastructure. 
Section 6 turns to the supply and composition of private capital, i.e. corporate finance and 
project finance. Section 7 looks at the facts for UK PPPs and PFI in a European and global context 
whereas Section 8 covers the growing importance of specialist infrastructure funds. Institutional 
investors, their role and challenges in infrastructure investment, are discussed in Section 9.  
Section 10 moves on to the new UK policy approaches with national infrastructure plans, the 
evolving project pipeline, the revised PF2 model and recent financing initiatives. A synthesis of 
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recommendations is given in Section 11. Section 12 summarises the findings and conclusions, 
with a short characterisation of the UK in the international context, and lessons for policy 
makers and investors. 
2 The historical perspective 
The UK is a country of early industrialization and urbanization with extensive construction of 
infrastructure, much of which was built during the 19th century. Some early networks, such as 
waterways, railways, and electricity grids, were not only innovative but also long-lasting. For 
example, 40 per cent of London’s water mains are over 100 years old. The average age of sewers 
in England and Wales is now about 70 years (HM Treasury 2010). 
Infrastructure investment has fluctuated considerably over time in terms of volume, structure 
and the source of financing. In Victorian times, railways and most other infrastructure projects 
were built and financed privately. Post World War II, a large proportion of infrastructure was 
nationalised. In the 1970s, public investment started to falter, as in other Western developed 
countries, and “cracks were beginning to show” (Helm 2013). 
In a radically different policy approach, telecom, water, gas, electricity, airports and rail assets 
were privatised in the 1980s. As a result, the state-owned enterprises’ (SOE) share of GDP fell 
from about 11% to 2% between 1979 and 1997 (European Commission 2016). The development 
and operation of economic infrastructure1 became, to a large extent, the responsibility of the 
private sector, much of it regulated by independent institutions (“regulators”). However, some 
infrastructure remains in the public sector, such as roads, London’s transport network, and flood 
defence. Also, there were some policy reversals, for example when the government retook 
control of the railway network in 2002. 
In the 1990s, the focus shifted to social infrastructure where new ways of financing through 
private capital emerged. The UK developed extensive experience with PPPs, especially through 
PFI, for a broad range of public services such as schools and hospitals. PFI is an alternative 
procurement method where the private sector finances, builds and operates infrastructure, 
while the public sector pays for services over the project life under a long term concession 
agreement (“availability payments”). 
                                                     
1 In this paper, a common distinction of economic infrastructure (primarily transport, energy, water and 
waste, telecommunications and digital networks) and social infrastructure (schools, universities, 
hospitals, care homes  etc.) is used. 
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Post financial crisis, infrastructure investment has moved up the political agenda and economic 
infrastructure sectors once more became a priority. The UK state has become more 
“interventionist” and “activist” in its infrastructure policies. It has developed “National 
Infrastructure Plans” (NIP) and project pipelines (since 2010) as well as new institutions and 
policy instruments. At the same time, PFI was reformed into the successor model PF2. 
Given the difficult state of public finances, private capital was expected to continue playing a 
core role in infrastructure. Several financing initiatives were launched to attract more investors 
to infrastructure in a country “open for business”. In fact, international investors have been 
flocking into the UK to buy real estate and infrastructure assets in recent years. 
The EU referendum in June 2016 led to new uncertainties over “Brexit”, with an immediate 
devaluation of Sterling and thus a cheapening of UK assets. The new administration seems to re-
emphasize public spending in both economic and social infrastructure. However, the room for 
fiscal manoeuvre is limited, and one can expect that more private capital will be sought, in 
particular from domestic institutional investors. 
2.1 Investment trends 
For some time now, the UK has been widely perceived as a “low investment country” compared 
to its own historical standards and to other countries. Reasons given include the change in the 
structure of the economy towards services, the slashing of (central and local) public investment 
budgets, and poor capital spending by privatised industries. 
Figure 1: Gross fixed capital formation (% GDP) 
   
 Source: World Bank (2017)     
Capital investment levels have been on a declining trend in most industrial countries for several 
decades. The UK has been 2-4% below the EU and OECD average over the last two decades in 
terms of overall gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) (infrastructure and non-infrastructure) as a 
6 
 
percentage of national income (Figure 1). The UK average over the last five years (2011-2015) 
was about 16% of GDP, the lowest in G7+ countries (Italy 18%, USA 19%, Germany 20%, France 
22%, Japan 23%, Canada 24% and Australia 27%) (World Bank 2017). (See Table 1 for a simple 
overview of the relative size of the UK economy in 2016.) 
The UK’s public investment in particular declined during the 1970s and 1980s, partly due to the 
privatisation of several key sectors, but also because of the reduction in public house-building. 
The UK was consistently below EU and OECD average until the financial crisis. Public Sector Net 
Investment (PSNI) was counter-cyclically lifted to 3.4% of GDP in 2009-10 but fell back again to 
1.7% of GDP (£32bn) in 2015-16. A small rise is forecast to 2.2% by 2021 (OBR 2017).  
Table 1: Size of the UK economy relative to the EU and the world (April 2017) 
 
Source: ONS, Eurostat, IMF, Author 
Note: In this report, £ refers to Pound Sterling, € to Euro, $ to US Dollar 
2.2 Development of UK infrastructure investment  
Figures for infrastructure investment developments are not readily available and any statistics 
need to be interpreted with great care. As in other countries, there is no official statistical 
definition of infrastructure investment. Estimates depend on a number of assumptions, e.g. the 
exact definition of “infrastructure”, the coverage of sectors and the availability of data. Not only 
the term “infrastructure” but also “investment” means different things to different people in 
different contexts in economics and financial practice.2 There are still a number of conceptual 
and data issues in this field and there is much scope for better statistics and more research. 
                                                     
2 Many figures are used in public discourse but it is not always clear what they mean. For example, 
“infrastructure” can refer to transport infrastructure only, to all economic infrastructure, or all social and 
economic infrastructure. Depending on the database, whole sectors may be included or excluded, e.g. 
telecommunication and digital networks. Also, there are major grey areas such as energy generation, 
utility conglomerates, infrastructure-related services or real estate sectors (including student homes, 
government offices buildings, stadiums and others entertainment buildings). Finally, data are frequently 
incomplete and not always transparent; data sources are often proprietary or expensive. (Beeferman and 
Wain 2012, Inderst 2013, Inderst et al. 2012). 
Region Currency GDP 2016 of which Source
unit (bn) UK (bn) in % (April 2017)
UK £ 1865 ONS
EU € 14820 2367 16.0% Eurostat
World $ 75278 2629 3.5% IMF
G7 + Australia $ 35705 2629 7.4% IMF
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According to McKinsey (2013), there has been a downward trend in economic infrastructure 
investment in the developed world, from 3.6% of GDP in 1980 to 2.8% in 2008, but spending has 
been rising in emerging economies, driven by China. Among advanced nations, the USA and the 
EU both spent 2.6% of GDP; spending in Japan was much higher, at about 5% of GDP. 
UK infrastructure investment has been weak compared to peer countries (Figure 2). OECD/ITF 
calculations of investment (GFCF) in four infrastructure sectors (energy, water, transport and 
communications) see the UK at around 2% of GDP in the 1990s and around 2¾% in recent years. 
This is about one percentage point behind the OECD average (HM Treasury 2011). In transport 
equipment, UK investment (0.6% of GDP) ranks lowest in the OECD countries (the OECD average 
is 2.1%) (TUC 2016). 
Figure 2: Economic infrastructure investment (% GDP) 
  
Source: ITF (2017) 
In an analysis of EU countries by Wagenvoort et al. (2010), the UK’s economic infrastructure 
investment was about 2.5% of GDP over the period 2006-2009, below the EU average of 2.9% 
(old member states pre-2004). Spending on social infrastructure amounted to about 1% of GDP 
in both the EU and UK. Using a narrower definition, EIB (2016a) found lower values for EU 
infrastructure investments, falling below 2% of GDP in the years 2012-2015 (of which 0.6% of 
GDP for social infrastructure).3 
                                                     
3 Wagenvoort et al (2010) use Eurostat statistics of (government and total) gross fixed capital formation 
in infrastructure sectors, a measure that includes some non-infrastructure spending such as machinery 
and equipment, and intellectual property products. Therefore, these figures can be regarded as an 
“upper bound” of infrastructure investment. EIB (2016a) uses new Eurostat data in “other buildings and 
structures”, which is one of six asset types within GFCF. In 2014, Eurostat implemented the national 
accounting framework to the new European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010). EIB 
(2016a) is excluding the UK and six other EU countries because of lack of data.  
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The UK government provided estimates of annual economic infrastructure investment – both 
public and private - of £49bn between 2010/11 and 2014/15 (2.8% of GDP). The figure is up from 
£42bn (2.5% of GDP) in the previous five years (HM Treasury 2016a). 
Using a broader definition of infrastructure (including extraction, manufacturing and social), PwC 
(2015a) estimated a $4tn spending globally, i.e. about 5.4% of GDP. The UK’s spending is 
calculated as £72bn in 2014, i.e. about 4% of GDP.4 It is expected to grow to £100bn by 2025 
(3.8% of GDP). 
UK infrastructure construction 
For the UK, more specific data on infrastructure construction spending (public and private) are 
available. It fluctuates around 1% of GDP, with peaks in the early 1990s (Channel Tunnel) and 
around the 2012 Olympic Games. The sectoral compositions saw a remarkable fall in road 
building (CECA 2013). There was also a dramatic shift in the construction activity to the private 
sector in the 1980s and 1990s, when the share of public construction fell to 30-40%. However, 
public construction has recovered somewhat in recent years (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Output in the UK construction industry (by type of work, £m) 
         
Source: ONS (2017) 
UK infrastructure capital stock 
According to the ONS (2016) estimates, the valuation of the UK public infrastructure in 2015 was 
£592bn (32% of GDP), of which £237bn were owned by the central government, £323bn by local 
                                                     
4 “Our definition of infrastructure is wide-ranging, encompassing a number of broad sectoral groupings 
and economic activities. We cover the sectors traditionally classified as infrastructure, such as 
transportation and utilities, but also analyse enabling capital projects in sectors such as extraction, 
manufacturing and social infrastructure.” (PwC 2015a) 
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government, and £33bn by public non-financial corporations. In addition, £467bn was recorded 
for private non-financial corporations and £2bn for other institutions, resulting in a total value of 
£1061bn, i.e. 58% of GDP.5  
International comparison on the infrastructure stock and flows of services are not readily 
available (Grice 2016). There is some evidence that the UK has a relatively low infrastructure 
capital stock to GDP ratio. McKinsey (2013), e.g., found a value of 57% for the UK while most 
major countries are around 70%. (Notable exceptions are “over-investing” Japan (179%) and 
“under-investing” Brazil (16%)). 
A similar picture emerges from Arcadis (2015) in their Global Built Asset Wealth Index that uses a 
much wider definition of tangible fixed capital investment, including infrastructure investment, 
construction, investments in plant and machinery. In 2015, the UK fell back to rank 13 out of 32 
countries assessed, with a total value of $5tn. In terms of built assets per capita, the UK is in 
place 17 behind all G7+ countries. Similar to the USA, it is an “undercapitalized” country, offering 
an opportunity for future productive investment. 
In summary, Western OECD have economies experienced a downward trend in fixed capital 
investment since the 1970s. The UK has been hovering around the bottom end of its peer 
countries. Investment in economic infrastructure is comparatively low at 2.5-2.8% of GDP, with 
social infrastructure spending estimated at around 1% of GDP. As a result, the UK infrastructure 
capital stock is roughly 10% lower than the average of advanced countries. There has also been a 
trend from public to private infrastructure construction spending over the last three decades but 
this may have come to a halt. 
3 Infrastructure investment needs 
That there should be more and better infrastructure is widely agreed. However, infrastructure 
investment needs are not easily quantifiable.6 Future spending is required not only to maintain 
existing but also to build new infrastructure. Most estimates concentrate on the investment 
                                                     
5 For an estimate of the “valuation of UK public infrastructure”, the ONS points at the National Balance 
Sheet dataset that provides estimates of the UK’s fixed non-financial assets. “Other structures” of fixed 
assets include roads, railways, pipelines, bridges and sports stadiums. Some assets may no longer be 
counted as being part of the public sector, for example as a result of privatisation (ONS 2015a). 
6 Most published global estimates are based on a small number of original studies (e.g. by the OECD and 
World Bank) that tried to quantify infrastructure investment needs some time ago. There are two basic 
approaches: top-down and bottom-up. The first is based on the development of macro-statistics such as 
GDP and capital stock. The second is based on “micro-economic” information, such as regional and 
sectoral case studies, planning documents from local entities or expert assessments. 
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needs to keep pace with “normal” economic and demographic growth. Building “greener” 
infrastructure for climate change mitigation and adaptation or to meet low-carbon targets 
requires additional resources. The same is true when other targets for social and human 
development are introduced that would require upgrades to existing infrastructure. As an 
indication, the transport (21%) and energy (35%) account for much of UK’s greenhouse gas 
emissions (HM Treasury 2010). 
UK projections 
For the UK, Helm (2009) calculated infrastructure investment requirements for Britain of £434bn 
to 2020 (Table 2). This sectoral approach covers the bulk of economic infrastructure. Energy will 
require over 60% of investment, half of which in renewable energy. Over a quarter would be 
needed in transport and about 10% in water. Including other sectors (e.g. mobile networks and 
masts, air traffic control, postal services), the aggregate figure for required investment could rise 
to about £500bn, i.e. an annual spend of £50bn (3% of GDP, in 2009 prices). 
These figures are considered crude and conservative approximations of minimum investments 
needs, and do not include social infrastructure. Subsequently, the Institute of Directors (2010) 
published similar estimates, adding up to £500bn over ten years: £300bn for energy (including 
energy efficiency measures), £130bn for transport, £40bn for water and £30bn for 
communications (including fibre optic networks, faster broadband). 
Table 2: Infrastructure investment required in Britain by 2020 
 
Source: Helm (2009) 
International comparisons of needs 
Global projections for economic infrastructure investment requirements range from a moderate 
annual 2.5% of GDP to an ambitious 4.5% and beyond. Core estimates appear to be around 3.5% 
to 3.8% until 2030, including emerging markets (Inderst 2013 and the literature quoted there). A 
Sector Requirement Cost (£ bn)
Energy Replacement requirement 42
Energy Investment in the networks 65
Energy Renewables 136
Energy Energy efficiency 21
Transport Rail networks and high speed lines 69
Transport London transport 32
Transport Roads 9
Transport Air transport 10
Communications Nationwide roll-out of Fibre / Very High Speed DSL 5
Water Water and sewerage networks 37
Water Flood and coastal defences 8
Total 434
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cautious projection for developed countries of 3% of GDP would result in an annual amount of 
roughly £55bn (in 2016 prices) for the UK. The OECD estimate for the UK is 3.5% of GDP, i.e. 
about £65bn. 
The European Commission has, over the years, increased substantially its estimates of economic 
infrastructure investment needs in the EU. A figure of €2tn up to 2020 was used in 2015, or an 
annual amount of €400bn on average, i.e. around 2.7% of GDP. EIB (2016b) identified 
investment needs in strategic infrastructure to achieve competitiveness and sustainable long-
term growth in the EU of nearly €700bn per year (4.6% of GDP in 2016 prices). The actual 
spending is just over half of that, leaving an annual investment gap of €335bn.  
For the USA, a region of a comparable size to the EU, ASCE (2016) estimated economic 
infrastructure investment needs are $3.6tn until 2025, i.e. an annual $360bn, or about 2% of 
GDP. Over half of that should go to surface transport and a quarter to electricity. In addition, 
schools, public parks and recreation would need an annual $100bn, or about 0.5% of GDP. 
(Telecommunication and digital, health and other social infrastructure are not included in this 
assessment). To close the $2tn infrastructure investment gap, spending would need to rise from 
2.5% of GDP to 3.5% of GDP over ten years.  
The NIP pipeline  
Starting in 2010, the UK government published a series of National Infrastructure Plans (NIP) 
with annual updates, called National Infrastructure Development Plans (NIDP) since 2016. They 
outline the direction of the infrastructure policy and produce an “infrastructure pipeline”, i.e. 
(public and private) projects planned or underway. 
The early plans covered seven key sectors (transport, energy, communications/digital, water, 
waste, flood and intellectual capital). Upstream oil and gas projects were added in 2014, and 
social infrastructure and housing in 2016. The latest 2016 plans set out over 700 projects and 
programmes with a value of £500bn over an indefinite period, half of which (with a value of 
£300bn) should be completed by 2020-21. The annual amount of about £60bn is divided 
between £53bn (about 2.8% of GDP) for economic infrastructure and £7bn (0.4% of GDP) for 
social infrastructure (HM Treasury 2016c).7 
Overall, the UK’s future economic infrastructure needs are (conservatively) estimated to be 
somewhat higher in future (i.e. increase from about 2.5% of GDP to 3-3.5% of GDP, or £55-65bn 
per annum in 2016 prices). Social infrastructure could need another 1-1.5% of GDP, i.e. £20-25bn 
                                                     
7 The (low) social infrastructure figures exclude a planned PF2 pipeline of unknown size that is expected in 
2017. (For simplicity, these percentage figures do not factor in growth projections.)  
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per annum. Additional requirements, e.g. for climate change policies or higher social targets, 
would come on top of that.  
4 Quality and attractiveness for investors 
Infrastructure is there to provide services to people and businesses. There is not only a 
quantitative but also a qualitative aspect to these services. How good is UK infrastructure? And 
for investors, the key question is: How good is the UK as a place to invest in infrastructure? 
The quality of infrastructure of a country can be assessed in very different ways. Some reports 
rely more on a selection of “objective” data, others on subjective opinions including surveys and 
expert commentary. Some studies are purely national while others create international league 
tables. Here are examples of some better known indicators. 
Domestic quality assessments 
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has run an annual infrastructure survey since 2011. In 
the CBI (2016) survey, 44% of the 728 senior UK business executives questioned found that 
infrastructure quality had improved in the previous five years; 23% thought it had deteriorated. 
However, with the exception of digital infrastructure, respondents were sceptical about 
improvements over the next five years, especially in aviation, energy and roads. Furthermore, 
only 26% were satisfied with the current state of their local infrastructure, 46% were dissatisfied. 
The Institution of Civil Engineers’ “state of the nation” report, running since the year 2000, is 
compiled using expertise from their members and “external stakeholders” across infrastructure 
sectors. ICE (2014) ranked water and strategic transport (including rail, highways, ports, airports) 
as B, waste as C+, energy and flood management as C- and local transport as D- (were A is best 
and E is worst). Back in 2003, infrastructure was generally marked as D+, with low marks for 
waste (D), energy (D+), rail (D) and urban regeneration (D).8 
International comparisons 
The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report uses a mixed approach of statistical 
information and opinions of business leaders worldwide. The message for the UK is mixed (and 
somewhat confusing). WEF (2016) ranks the UK in 7th place (out of 138 countries) for overall 
                                                     
8 ASCE (2017) undertakes a similar exercise for the USA with similar poor results. The overall rating of US 
infrastructure is D+. Rail moved up to a B rating, whereas bridges, ports, and solid waste got a C+. All 
other categories had an unsatisfactory D rating. 
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competitiveness, and in 9th place for the sub-indicator “infrastructure”. On the latter, it is in the 
mid-field of the G7+, just behind Japan, Germany and France but ahead of the USA, Canada, 
Australia and Italy.9 The WEF survey also includes a question regarding the executives’ opinion of 
the “quality of overall infrastructure”. Here the UK performs rather poorly (24th), only beating 
Australia (33) and Italy (57) of its G7+ peers. It is less clear why the subjective assessment of the 
UK looks so much worse than the combined infrastructure sub-indicator for competitiveness. 
An alternative New Global Index of Infrastructure (Donaubauer et al. 2014) that only uses 
objective data (without input from surveys) sees the UK in 10th position out of 140 countries and 
in the middle of its peer group (behind Germany, USA, Canada and Japan but ahead of France, 
Australia and Italy). The UK is ranked 9th for transport, 8th for ICT but only 32nd for energy. 
“Financial infrastructure” is another new aspect in this index with the UK in 8th place. 
Noteworthy that the UK’s position in 2010 has hardly changed since 1990 and 2000. 
There are also sector-specific indicators available. The World Bank Logistics Performance Index 
(World Bank 2016) evaluates the performance on domestic and international trade logistics. One 
sub-indicator is “infrastructure”, i.e. quality of trade and transport related infrastructure (e.g., 
ports, railroads, roads, information technology). The UK is ranked 5th out of 160 countries in 
2016, and 2nd within G7+ behind Germany. 
Environmental indices also have some relevance for the infrastructure discussion. For example, 
the Yale University’s Environmental Performance Index (EPI 2016) places the UK 12th of 180. 
Within the G7+, only France is ahead of the UK. Top rankings for wastewater and electricity 
access are contrasted by weaker ratings for air pollution, carbon emissions and carbon intensity. 
Infrastructure investment conditions 
The macro-environment of the UK has been considered one of the most favourable in the world 
for some time.10 In terms of investment conditions, the positives include the stability of the 
political system, clear property rights, a proven regulatory system, strong financial markets and 
investor base, and high credit ratings (Citibank 2016). Uncertainties arise, for example, from 
                                                     
9 The “infrastructure pillar” in the WEF (2016) survey gives a weight of half for transport and half for 
electricity and telephone infrastructure, i.e. no inclusion of water and waste, social or other 
infrastructure. Looking at the three objective components, UK statistics are relatively good for air 
passenger transport capacity (global rank 3) and fixed telephone network (8) but very poor for mobile 
phone subscriptions (56). Among the six subjective assessments of infrastructure, the (perceived) quality 
of electricity supply (rank 11) and the quality of ports (12) compare relatively well. The quality of air 
transport infrastructure (18), railroads (19) and especially roads (27) are seen as less competitive. 
10 Credit ratings by major rating agencies early 2017: Moody’s Aa1, S&P AA, Fitch AA, DBRS AAA, JCR AAA, 
Dagon A+. Most agencies downgraded the UK after the EU referendum in June 2016. 
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(actual and potential) policy reversals (e.g. in energy), the relationship with the EU and questions 
over its own regional constitutions. 
Some private sector reports evaluate the investment conditions and attractiveness of UK 
infrastructure. In general, the UK does relatively well in these surveys, and has also been able to 
attract real investment flows into infrastructure. 
The Arcadis (formerly Harris) Global Infrastructure Investment Index (Arcadis 2016) aims at 
ranking countries according to their relative attraction to infrastructure investors in the long run 
(5+ years).11 The consultancy firm puts the UK in position 9 out of 41 countries in 2016, 
improving from 10th in 2014 and 13th in 2012. It is behind Canada and the USA but ahead of 
Australia, Japan and the other large EU countries.  
The Nabarro Infrastructure Index (Nabarro 2016) is another measure of infrastructure 
investment attractiveness.12 The UK is ranked top out of 25 countries by the law firm. Among the 
factors of strength are the relatively high degree of private sector participation in infrastructure 
projects, the “ease of doing business” and “national stability”. 
The G20’s Global Infrastructure Hub developed an “InfraCompass” that identifies the key drivers 
of successful infrastructure planning and delivery in various jurisdictions (GIH 2017). Three 
drivers are related to policy (governance, regulatory, permits) and three related to delivery 
(plan, procure, deliver). The United Kingdom broadly performs above the average among 
developed countries in most of the 38 metrics. 
Some indices, however, contain warning signals. For example, the Renewable Energy Country 
Attractiveness Index (RECAI) has seen the UK’s position gradually deteriorating in recent years. In 
the latest edition (Ernst & Young 2017), the UK is in place 10, down from place 5 in 2010. This is 
mainly due to the volatile government energy policies. Among G7+, only Canada (11th) and Italy  
(18th) are currently ranked lower. 
To sum it up, quality assessments of the infrastructure in the UK give a mixed picture. National 
surveys rate most of UK infrastructure rather poorly. In international surveys, the country is seen 
in the mid-field of comparable economies with a great variation across sectors: water and waste 
                                                     
11 This assessment is based on national statistics and open source data focused on anticipated 
investment, ease of doing business and comparable levels of investment risk. The ranking uses 24 
indicators across five categories (economy, business environment, risk, infrastructure, finance).  
12 It indicates which jurisdictions promise to be the most fertile for infrastructure investments, and which 
have delivered in the past. The index collates quantitative information on each market based on 13 
individual indicators that are grouped in six sub-indices: credit and stability, sustainability and innovation, 
tax environment, national stability, ease of doing business and private participation rate sub-index. 
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tend to look solid, energy about average, but there are also rather poor transport networks. In 
contrast, UK infrastructure is widely considered as an attractive investment target but there are 
warning signals on the horizon. Social infrastructure is rarely covered by such assessments 
although that would be desirable. 
5 Ownership and control 
Who owns UK infrastructure? Since privatisation, the utility companies have undergone a shift in 
ownership. Many listed companies were acquired by large global utility corporate entities and 
then, in more recent years, infrastructure funds, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) und pension 
funds (Helm and Tindall 2009). These new “specialist infrastructure investors” now control 56% 
of the water and sewerage industry, the major airports, as well as many electricity and gas 
distribution networks (PwC 2015b).  
In 2010, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT 2010) undertook a one-off stock-take of the ownership 
and control of UK economic infrastructure. It analysed over 200 companies operating in four 
economic infrastructure sectors (energy, water, transport and communications). 42% of UK 
infrastructure companies are listed, 29% of which are listed in the UK (such as the well-known 
energy or water utilities) and 13% on a foreign stock exchange (such as RWE, Veolia). 31% are 
under private ownership, e.g. by an infrastructure or private equity fund, pension fund or bank. 
18% are owned by local or central government, and 9% by not-for-profit organisations. 
There are significant differences across sectors. Listed companies are prominent in energy and 
telecommunications. There is greater involvement of private companies in water, waste, ports, 
airports and car parks. And there is a relatively high proportion of not-for-profit operators in the 
rail sector (primarily because of Network Rail) and in ports (trust ports).13 Given cross holdings 
and indirect investments, it is difficult to work out the ultimate owner of UK infrastructure but 
the OFT (2010) report gives some indications. Domestic institutional investor ownership is about 
one third.14 Over the last ten years, there has been a move away from UK listed companies 
towards infrastructure funds and overseas owners. Overseas ownership is approximately 38%. 
Foreigners appear strongly represented in airports and waste but less so in the rail sector.  
                                                     
13 When the government re-took control over the rail network in 2002, Network Rail was created as a 
formally private “not for dividend” company with government guarantee. Following the implementation 
of the ESA10 in 2014, it was reclassified as a central government body. Discussions are ongoing about full 
nationalisation or full privatisation (e.g. Wellings 2016). 
14 For example, pension funds hold 7% of UK infrastructure (of which 3% privately and 4% via listed 
companies). In this calculation, insurance companies only hold listed companies (4%) while infrastructure 
funds (10%) and private equity funds (2%) only have private holdings. 
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The magazine Financial News (Cobley 2014) undertook an update of the 234 regulated assets in 
the UK as identified by the OFT in 2010. The proportion held by infrastructure and pension funds 
rose from 22% to 28% between 2010 and 2013, while the share owned by listed companies 
dropped further from 30% to 25%. It is also worth noting that the ownership of stocks on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) by overseas investors has risen from under 10% in the 1960s-1980s 
to 31% in 1998, and to 54% in 2014 (of which 26% from Europe) (ONS 2015b). 
Foreign direct investment 
The UK has been successful in attracting investors from overseas. “The UK starts from a strong 
position, as the leading location for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Europe” (HM Government 
2017, p. 79). A high proportion of FDI goes into infrastructure industries.15 Some of FDI goes into 
new projects. According to FT (2016), in 2016 and 2015, the UK received $53bn and $35bn of 
greenfield FDI, a share of 34% and 28% of Europe. The UK is the leading destination for wind 
power projects, with investment peaking in 2015 at almost $8bn. As for the future, Pinsent 
Masons (2014) expect particularly strong inflows from China into UK real estate and 
infrastructure until 2025 (£105bn, of which £43.5bn into energy and £35.5bn in transport). 
The high degree of non-domestic ownership in infrastructure is seen as problematic by various 
sides (e.g. Raco 2016). The UK water sector is a popular example. Of the 10 privatised water 
companies, only three remain listed on the LSE. Six are unlisted water companies, and one 
(Welsh Water) is run as a not-for-profit company (Allen and Pryke 2016). Many rail companies 
are run by Dutch, French, German, Italian or Chinese companies (Topham 2017).  
Foreign ownership of “critical” sectors or industries, including “strategic infrastructure” is subject 
of political discussions in many places. Several Western countries have introduced FDI limitations 
or review procedures to protect national interests and security, e.g. France, the USA, Italy, 
Canada or Australia (UNCTAD 2016). 
In conclusion, the UK’s infrastructure has a remarkably broad mix of owners. As a result of the 
privatisations in the 1980s, only about one third is left in public hands, most notably the roads. 
Specialist investors such as SWFs, infrastructure funds, private equity and pension funds have 
increased their exposures in recent times. The UK has been very open for FDI. About 40% of the 
country’s infrastructure is owned by foreign investors although this varies widely across sectors. 
                                                     
15 “The UK reached a total of $1,606 billion (£975 billion) last year in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
stock, which is almost $500 billion more than any other European country. Over half of the £975 billion 
FDI in the UK in 2013-14 is in energy or other infrastructure schemes, also creating 31,261 jobs.” (HM 
Treasury 2014, p. 110). 
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6 Supply of private capital 
Let us now turn to the supply of capital for UK infrastructure and its composition. The public 
sector was central to the ownership, financing, and delivery of infrastructure services post-World 
War II. The traditional approach relies on governments using its revenue (either from taxes or 
borrowing) to finance new or upgrade existing infrastructure. The design and construction can 
be procured through competitive tenders from private firms but the state still owns and 
operates projects after completion.  
Private participation rose in several countries from the 1980s as a result of privatisations and, 
from the 1990s, with PPP schemes. Today, most developed countries, with the notable 
exception of Japan, have a higher share of private financing in infrastructure than developing 
countries. For example, in the EU, the ratio of public to private financing is roughly 1:2 to 1:3 in 
the old member states (Wagenvoort et al. 2010). There are different dimensions to the supply of 
capital for infrastructure (Figure 4): 
Figure 4: Sources of infrastructure finance 
 
Source: Author 
1. There are public or private sources of finance. Public capital comes from central, regional, 
local and other government institutions, plus national and international development banks, 
such as UK Green Investment Bank or the European Investment Bank (EIB).  
2. Private capital is provided in two main forms: corporate finance (financed “on balance sheet” 
from the own resources of operating or service companies) and project finance, a contractual 
financing arrangement that is particularly important in infrastructure.16 
                                                     
16 Project finance is the financing of long-term infrastructure, industrial, extractive, environmental and 
other projects or public services (including social, sports and entertainment PPPs) based upon a limited 
recourse financial structure where project debt and equity used to finance the project are paid back from 
the cash flow generated by the project (typically, a special purpose entity (SPE) or vehicle (SPV)). 
18 
 
3. Within corporate finance, one can distinguish between listed (publicly traded) and unlisted 
(privately traded) companies. Within project finance, one can distinguish between PPP and 
non-PPP arrangements. PPPs are a form of project finance that involves a contract between a 
public sector authority and a private party to provide a public project or service.17 
4. There is typically a mix of equity and debt (loans and bonds) finance. Infrastructure and PPP 
projects in particular are often highly leveraged. 
5. Infrastructure companies can operate in a regulated or unregulated business.  
From an investor perspective, this results in a multi-dimensional universe of equity and debt 
finance, listed and unlisted investment vehicles, direct and indirect (e.g. funds) investment 
routes. Table 3 presents the main investment instruments used in the market. 
 
Table 3: Infrastructure investment vehicles 
 
Source: Author 
Funding and financing of UK infrastructure  
In the discussion of infrastructure, the terms “funding” and “financing” are often used 
interchangeably, even in official and academic documents, which can create considerable 
confusion. It is advisable to clearly separate the definitions: 
 Funding: the ultimate revenue source (who ultimately pays for infrastructure, i.e. the 
users/consumers or taxpayers (via some form of state budget), or a combination of both. 
                                                     
17 Depending on the constituency, such schemes are referred to as PPP, P3 or PFI. Typically, a public 
sector consortium forms a SPV to develop, build, maintain and operate the asset for the contracted 
period. The risk-sharing depends on the specific contract. 
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 Financing: the provision of upfront capital for an infrastructure, which is primarily an 
intermediary activity. There are public, private or combined sources of finance. 
About 70% of the UK economic infrastructure is estimated to be funded by private sources. 
There are examples of public funding (most roads), private funding (e.g. major airports, cable 
networks, energy, water and sewerage, commercial waste disposal) or mixed public/private (e.g. 
Network Rail). Table 4 gives an overview of both the current funding and the financing (and 
regulatory) regimes across economic infrastructure sectors in the UK. 
Table 4: UK economic infrastructure funding and financing models 
 
Source: HM Treasury (2016b) 
We now look at the main building blocks of data, keeping the various conceptual and data issues 
in mind in relation to the information available. 
6.1 Corporate finance and the RAB model 
Traditional corporate finance is the dominant force in private infrastructure finance in the UK, 
much of it regulated by independent institutions according to the UK model of “regulated asset 
base” (RAB) (Box 1).18 Most of the investment in regulated sectors is “on balance sheet”. The 
same is true for developers in unregulated sectors, such as waste management, ports, major 
airports, oil & gas, and traditionally also in electricity generation.  
                                                     
18 In the RAB model, private (or corporatized state-owned) companies act as the infrastructure manager: 
they own, invest in and operate infrastructure assets. The manager receives charges revenue from users 
and/or subsidies to fund its operations and recoup investment costs. To control a natural monopoly, an 
economic regulator is established to provide efficiency incentives and to cap prices, revenue, rates or 
return received by the infrastructure manager to improve social welfare (Makovšek and Veryard 2016). 
20 
 
Box 1: The UK model of utility regulation 
The British model of independent utility regulation started with the Littlechild Report on telecom 
regulation in 1983. It set out the key aspects of the regulatory framework for Oftel, the new 
telecom regulator, in connection with the privatisation of British Telecom. Since then, 
independent economic regulators have also been established for other sectors (UKRN 2014): 
- electricity and natural gas: Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)  
- water: Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat for England) 
- large airports: Civil Aviation Authority (AAA) 
- railways: Office of Rail Regulation, since 2015 Office of Rail and Road (ORR)19 
- broadcasting, telecommunications and postal industries: Office of Communications (Ofcom) 
- regional regulators (e.g. The Utility Regulator, regulating electricity, gas, water and sewerage 
industries in Northern Ireland).  
The RAB model was developed to value existing assets as a part of the privatisation process. It is 
used mainly for (economic) sectors funded by user/consumer payments. The RAB model was 
also proposed for social infrastructure but the UK governments have favoured a PPP model in 
those sectors. 
The main characteristics of the UK regulatory system are private ownership, competition, 
independence and “light-handedness”. The central feature of the “incentive-based” price 
regulation in the British utility model is the periodic resetting of regulated prices (5-8 years) in 
the light of forward looking efficiency gains and investment requirements, using an expected 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (Stern 2014).  
In terms of investment, it has brought significant amounts of capital into infrastructure at both a 
low cost and a long-term basis (Helm 2009). Some sectors did better than others. For example, 
£126bn has been invested in water infrastructure alone since privatisation, according to the 
National Audit Office (NAO). The UK regulated networks also received a vote of confidence from 
infrastructure investors who invested an estimated $66bn between 2002 and 2015, of which 
$52bn in water and waste (First State Investments 2016). Nonetheless, under-investment has 
remained a much discussed issue in UK regulated infrastructure. 
 
                                                     
19 Since 2015, ORR is also responsible for monitoring and enforcing the performance and efficiency of 
Highways England (which was previously the Highways Agency). Highways England maintains, renews, 
operates and improves the strategic road network – the motorways and main “A” roads in England. 
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Listed infrastructure equity 
Companies listed on public exchanges are sizeable owners of infrastructure assets, providers of 
infrastructure services and investors in infrastructure projects. They range from specialist 
businesses to diversified conglomerates. In the UK, utilities have been an important element of 
stock markets since their privatisation; they have substantial weight in investor universes and 
indices. UK regulated firms have an enterprise value of over £150bn (HM Treasury 2016b). 
The UK All Share Index had a market capitalisation of $2.2tn as of end 2016. The five stocks in 
the telecoms (£82bn) and the seven stocks in the utilities sectors (£79bn) had market weightings 
of 3.7% and 3.5% respectively. Transport infrastructure is barely represented in the UK listed 
stock universe, in contrast to some countries on the Continent. In addition, there are a number 
of listed infrastructure funds (e.g. 3i, HICL, IPP, GCP, John Laing) that invest at least part of their 
assets in the UK. The AIC (2017) lists seven infrastructure funds (£8.4bn), six renewable energy 
funds (£3.6bn) and three utility/water funds (£0.2bn) with a total market capitalization of over 
£12bn, i.e. a combined weight of about 0.5% of the stock market. 
Summing up the various segments, infrastructure stocks (in a broad definition) represent about 
9% on the London stock market, and about 11% in relation to GDP. In addition, there are 
corporations in other sectors such as construction (e.g. Balfour Beatty, Carillion) or oil & gas that 
undertake infrastructure investments, at least as part of their activities.  
Infrastructure companies constitute about 5-6% of global stock markets (S&P 2007, Inderst 
2010). With the emergence of the infrastructure investment theme in the mid-2000s, the major 
index providers all started to offer specialist infrastructure indices. Today, global infrastructure 
stock market indices contain a diverse range of infrastructure (and utilities) companies with a 
market capitalisation up to $3tn.20  
Indices vary greatly in terms of country weightings. The weighting of the UK is typically in the 
range of 5-10% (GLIO 2017).21 At the end of 2016, National Grid was by far the largest UK stock 
in global listed infrastructure indices. Other stocks appearing include United Utilities, Severn 
Trent, SSE, Centrica, Pennon, Inmarsat and Vodafone. 
                                                     
20 There are differences between indices in terms of the size and number of stocks included, the countries 
and regions covered, and the particular index methodology. The main differences concern the selection 
of sectors and sub-sectors for such indices, especially telecom companies and diversified utilities. Some 
indices contain over 80% utility stocks. 
21 For example, the UK weighting in the Dow Jones Brookfield Global Infrastructure Index is 8.5%, in the 
S&P Global Infrastructure Index 5.8%, in the MSCI World Infrastructure Index 6.5% and in the FTSE Global 
Infrastructure Index 5.4% at the end of 2016. 
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Corporate bonds 
Utility and telephone companies in the UK regularly issue corporate bonds (fixed coupon and 
index-linked) that have traditionally been popular with institutional and individual investors. 
Infrastructure bond indices were unknown in the past except in Canada and in the US municipal 
bond market. Given the increasing investor interest in infrastructure debt, new global indices are 
being created in this field. For example, the Dow Jones Brookfield Global Infrastructure 
Corporate Bond Index was started in 2015 and the Markit iBoxx infrastructure bond indices for 
investment grade corporate bonds in $, € and £ in 2016. 
To recap, around 70% of UK infrastructure is estimated to be financed by private sources of 
capital. Traditional corporate finance is the dominant force; much of it is regulated by 
independent institutions in the UK RAB model. Listed companies play an important role for 
infrastructure investment. In international comparison, one can note a strong presence of 
privatised utility and telecom stocks (weighting of nearly 10% on the LSE), and a near-absence of 
transport in the UK public listings. Social infrastructure is widely absent from the stock markets 
everywhere. The UK has a weighting of 5-10% in global infrastructure indices. London is also one 
of the main markets for listed infrastructure funds. 
6.2 Project finance 
Project finance has traditionally been used for both private and public infrastructure. Project 
finance statistics are often used for representations of private finance developments in 
infrastructure. However, it should be noted that project finance reaches beyond infrastructure, 
and infrastructure investment goes much further than project finance. 
According to Dealogic (2015), the global project finance volume (equity and debt) was $408bn 
from about 1100 deals in 2014. Annual volumes have fluctuated in the region of $400bn in 
recent years. The regional shares tend to fluctuate considerably over the years, especially in 
Europe. European project finance volumes have been in the range of $60-110bn since the late-
2000s. Europe has relatively high share of renewable energy and social project deals (social 
infrastructure is typically included in project finance databases (Inderst 2013)). 
The UK is one of the leading countries for project finance although activity fluctuates. The UK 
was in fifth position in 2014 in the country rankings behind the USA, India, Australia and Brazil. 
The volume of $18bn from 48 deals gave the UK a market share of 23% within Europe and 4% 
globally. In 2013 (2012), the UK was in fourth (fifth) position with a market share of 45% (27%) 
within Europe and 8% (5%) globally. 
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InfraDeals (2016) collects data on project finance transactions in infrastructure sectors. UK deal 
volumes were $52bn in the year 2015 and $41bn in 2014. This leaves the UK with a global 
market share of 15% in 2015 and 16% in 2014. Transport (share of 35% in value terms), 
renewables (28%) and water & waste (22%) are the largest sectors. Social infrastructure has a 
share of 9% in the UK.  
Project finance debt market 
Europe is notoriously “bank-centric” in its infrastructure finance. Project finance debt markets 
took a hit during the financial crisis, especially in Europe including the UK. Many banks are still in 
the process of repairing their balance sheets. With Basel III regulation, European banks were said 
to be less willing and able to finance over longer maturities. However, there has been some 
recovery in the commercial loan market in recent times, not the least boosted by very 
expansionary monetary policies. Also, some non-European banks, e.g. Japanese banks, have 
continued to offer long-term loans to infrastructure projects. 
The data provider Thomson Reuters (2017) concentrates on project finance loans. The global 
loan volume in 2015 was $231bn from 765 deals; the European volume was $87bn from 335 
deals. The UK posted 72 transactions with a loan volume of $18bn in 2015. The UK’s market 
share in 2015 (2014) was 21% (24%) within Europe and 8% (6%) globally. 
Project bonds and green finance 
Project bonds22 constitute about 10% of global project debt in the long term. They are 
historically more common in North America than in Europe. As an example, Canada is a country 
with a well-established project bond market, and a history of insurance companies being long-
term investors in them. Project bond markets came to a near standstill during the financial crisis 
with the demise of “monoline” insurance companies but new issues have recovered over the last 
few years. Some help was given by the Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative by the EU and the 
EIB. It aimed at kick-starting an ailing capital market and at facilitating more private finance of 
infrastructure projects (European Commission 2011).23  
                                                     
22 Project bonds are debt instruments issued by project finance companies for investment by institutional 
investors and other financial institutions. They are often tradable on secondary markets but can also be 
private placements. 
23 Credit enhancements in the form of a subordinated instrument (either a loan or a contingent facility) 
should make senior bonds more attractive for institutional investors. Many investors require an 
investment grade rating (i.e. above “BB”), if not a “single A”, as a minimum requirement. 
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According to InfraDeals (2016), the UK placed project bonds with a value of $2.9bn and $4.7bn in 
capital markets in 2015 and 2014, i.e. 6% and 12% of the infrastructure project finance deal 
volume. Examples include social housing and student accommodation in the UK. 
“Green finance” has been rising strongly in recent years, including the issuance of “green” or 
“climate bonds”. The definition of green bonds varies in several respects, and it includes both 
corporate and project bonds. The City of London (2016) counted 39 green bonds listed on the 
LSE, raising $9.3bn in seven currencies. Furthermore, 38 green companies have raised $10bn, 
including 14 renewable investment funds and 12 alternative fuel companies. 
In summary, there have been strong fluctuations in the global project finance markets. The UK 
project finance volume is sizeable compared to GDP (about 1-2%). The UK also has an above-
average market share of deals within Europe and worldwide. The European market for project 
bonds has revived since 2013 but is still very small. London is a centre of the global project 
finance and green bond business. 
7 Public-private partnerships 
Public–private partnerships (PPP) have become increasingly relevant for public infrastructure 
investment, as an alternative to spending by the governments or private-sector infrastructure 
companies. The UK and Australia were early adopters of PPPs in the 1990s, with PPPs accounting 
for around 10% and 5% of public investment in infrastructure (OECD 2014a). Many other 
countries followed, including Canada that developed one of the most efficient PPP models. 
Global PPP volumes were in the region of US $ 60-100bn in total in recent years. According to 
Dealogic (2015), the 2014 total volume was $72bn, compared to $95bn and $63bn in previous 
years. The share of PPP within project finance ranges is traditionally 15-25%. Western Europe 
was the leading region in terms of PPP, with a market share of 25% in 2014, 28% in 2013 and 
24% in 2012. 
The European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC) reported PPP figures for the European markets in the 
region of €12bn-21bn since 2009, i.e. around 0.1% of GDP. The best years were 2005 to 2008. In 
2016, the volume was €12bn, down from €15.6bn in 2015. However, the number of deals was up 
from 49 to 69. The UK was the largest market with a volume of €3.8bn in 2016 (EPEC 2017). In 
the past, the UK accounted for nearly half of European PPP volumes but the share has declined 
substantially due to the sharp fall in PFI deals in social infrastructure. 
Over the five year period 2012 – 2016, the UK and France posted the highest number of deals.  
In terms of volume, the UK volume is €24.8bn, equivalent to about 0.2% of GDP. It has the 
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highest market share over the five years of 31% of the European volume of €78.8bn, followed by 
Turkey (25%), France (12%), Italy (7%) and the Netherlands (7%) (Figure 5). Within EU countries, 
the UK’s share is 42%. Transport is by far the strongest sector in terms of volume across Europe 
while the highest number of (smaller) deals is in social infrastructure, especially education. 
Figure 5: The European PPP market by country over the period 2012-2016 (€bn) 
 
Source: EPEC (2017) 
Europe’s PPP bond market is rather small and underdeveloped. There was an exception in the 
UK, where PFI bonds were more common before the financial crisis, typically “wrapped” or 
guaranteed by a ‘monoline’ insurer. Institutional investors reportedly bought approximately 
£15bn of bonds issued by PPP project companies in the UK between 1997 and 2008. PPP bonds 
have re-emerged since 2013. 
7.1 UK’s PFI model 
In the UK, PPPs are not used for all infrastructure sectors but are concentrated on social 
infrastructure, municipal waste management and on transport projects, e.g. some motorways, 
tunnels and bridges (starting with the Channel Tunnel by a French-British consortium in 1986). 
The UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is a form of PPP. It was announced in 1992 to enable the 
use of private money to deliver the design, construction and servicing of a range of public 
infrastructure.24 After a review of PFI, the UK Government set out a new approach called PF2 in 
2012. This procurement method accounted for about 25% of public sector capital investment 
                                                     
24 Most of UK PFI follows the DBFO model (design, build, finance and operate) or BOOT model (build, 
own, operate, transfer) of private sector participation. There are other PPP contractual schemes in place 
in many other countries (see, e.g., Engel et al. 2015, RICS 2013). 
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between 2000 and 2012. PFI has been dominant in some sectors, accounting for 70% of schools 
and 60% of hospitals (TheCityUK 2014). 
UK Government statistics show that 716 PFI projects had reached financial close to the end of Q1 
2016, with an aggregate capital value of £59.4bn. The value of PFI projects has been declining in 
recent years from a peak of £7.2bn in 2006 to around £1bn since 2013 (Figure 6). The number of 
projects has dropped from 50-70 annually during the period 1999-2007 to less than 10 per 
annum (HM Treasury 2016d). This is a fall from about 0.5% of GDP to less than 0.1%. 
Figure 6: PFI project numbers and capital values  
  
Source: HM Treasury (2016d) 
Over the period 1992-2012, the majority of PFI went into social infrastructure: hospitals £13.5bn 
(share of 24%), schools £12.1bn (21%) and offices (e.g. fire & police, courts, service centres) 
5.1bn (9%) (TheCityUK 2014). However, the health and education sectors saw particularly 
pronounced declines in recent years. In terms of economic infrastructure, transport projects had 
a total capital value of about £7.6bn (share of 13%) and waste treatment £4.7bn (8%) over the 
20 years. In terms of size, only 6 projects had a capital value above £1bn. Most of the large 
projects were concentrated in defence or in transport.  
To sum it up, European PPPs suffered under the financial crisis and recession. In the UK, policy 
changes for PFI also contributed to the setback. PFI volumes have fallen back from about 0.5% of 
GDP in 2006 to less than 0.1%. The UK had in the past produced nearly half of Europe’s PPP 
volumes, primarily driven by social infrastructure, but the share has declined to about 30%, 
equivalent to about 0.2% of GDP. Transport PPPs still play a smaller role in the UK than on the 
Continent. PPP bonds have re-emerged over the last few years. 
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8 Infrastructure funds  
Since the emergence of the infrastructure investment theme in the mid-2000, much of the focus 
has been on private infrastructure investments, especially on infrastructure equity funds. In 
recent years, interest has also risen in debt funds, and in direct investments in infrastructure 
projects and companies by large investors. We now take a look at some figures for the capital 
raised by such funds, the volume of deals they generate, and the UK investor base in this field. 
Specialist funds 
Dedicated infrastructure funds were first created in Australia in the 1990s, and were typically 
listed funds. Since the mid-2000s, private equity-type, closed-end infrastructure funds have been 
growing in Europe, the USA and elsewhere. Data provider Preqin reports over $300bn unlisted 
infrastructure assets under management at the end of 2015 from over 400 funds globally (Preqin 
2016a). Early in 2017, a further 168 funds went on the market, seeking $102bn in new capital. 
The majority are equity funds but lately private debt funds have been growing on the market. 95 
unlisted debt funds have reached financial close since 2006 with an aggregate volume of $43bn.  
The UK-based unlisted infrastructure fund market is the largest in Europe, with roughly half the 
capital raised for Europe-based infrastructure funds over the last three years (Preqin 2016b). The 
database records 113 UK-based funds that reached financial close since 2006 with a combined 
volume of £51bn, i.e. about £6bn per year on average. Preqin also found 66 asset managers with 
headquarters in the UK in 2013 in charge of 91 funds with an aggregate capital of $69bn, giving 
the UK a global market share of 22%. The unlisted infrastructure market shows a high degree of 
concentration. Macquarie Infrastructure and Real Assets (considered a manager with UK 
headquarter in this survey) manages 40% of these assets.  
As an alternative data source, Willis Towers Watson (2016) reported $375bn in infrastructure 
funds managed by 58 infrastructure fund managers globally. 45% of them are based in Europe, 
32% in North America, 18% in Asia and 5% elsewhere. The largest manager, Macquarie Group 
(considered to be domiciled in Australia in this survey) controls a quarter of the assets under 
management, totalling $95bn. There are 14 UK infrastructure fund managers in the survey of 
602 alternative asset managers, with a total infrastructure volume of $41bn, i.e. a combined 
market share of 11%. The three largest UK-domiciled funds are InfraRed Capital Partners (assets 
under management $6.8bn), Hermes ($5.1bn) and Aviva ($4.4bn).  
Deals by infrastructure funds 
Preqin registered around 1000 deals per annum worldwide with a reported annual deal value 
around $200bn in the years 2013-2016, of which about 40% are in Europe. The UK is by far the 
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most important market in Europe, with over half of the deals and nearly half of the transaction 
values over the period 2008-2015. There are about 100-250 UK deals per annum, and the annual 
reported deal value is about £25bn on average over the last decade, i.e. 1.5% of GDP (Figure 7). 
Renewable energy and social infrastructure constitute the highest numbers of UK transactions. 
Volumes are influenced by some larger transport and other energy deals, e.g. the Hinkley Point C 
(a deal worth £18bn) and the Thames Tideway Tunnel (£4.2bn). In international comparison, the 
UK has recently been strong in several sectors (e.g. number 1 in social infrastructure, airports 
and wind power, and number 2 behind France in nuclear energy). 
Figure 7: Number and Value of UK Infrastructure Deals, 2006- April 2016  
 
Source: Preqin (2016b) 
Overall, private equity investments by specialist infrastructure funds have become an 
increasingly important financing vehicle for infrastructure projects. The UK gets about half of 
European and around one fifth of the global deals, with a volume of 1-2% of GDP. It has a 
particularly strong presence in social infrastructure and green energy. More recently, 
infrastructure debt investing has become more popular. London is an financial centre with a high 
share of headquarters of infrastructure fund managers. 
9 Institutional investors as financiers 
Institutional investors traditionally play an important role in the UK for capital markets and the 
economy. However, the importance of UK institutional investors on the UK stock market has 
been falling for some time. UK insurance companies held about 6% of the UK stock market in 
2014, UK pension funds about 3%, which is much less than in the 1980s (ONS 2015a). 
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The main reason is a sharp trend towards “de-risking” that has an important side-effect on the 
provision of capital for infrastructure investment. To illustrate this: the asset allocation of UK 
pension funds to domestic equities was down by about two thirds to 16% between 2001 and 
2015 (UBS 2016). Assuming, for simplicity, that 10% of the stock market is infrastructure-related, 
this implies a holding of 1.6% instead of 4.6% in utility stocks, i.e. a reduction of about £60bn. 
Preqin (2016b) keeps 237 UK-based infrastructure investors in the database with total assets of 
£4.8tn. 60% of the UK universe invests indirectly into infrastructure via unlisted funds, 21% in 
listed funds and 19% directly. Private pension funds are more strongly represented among 
infrastructure investors in the UK (33%) than on the Continent (17%). The opposite is true for 
insurance companies. The share of UK direct investors in infrastructure projects is markedly 
smaller than in the rest of the Europe (29%). 
Among the global top 100 infrastructure investors, 12 are UK based (Preqin 2015), the largest 
being the insurers Legal & General (with infrastructure assets of $4.6bn), Prudential/M&G 
($3.1bn), and the USS pension scheme ($3.2bn). A different investor survey calculated by S&P 
(2016) lists 11 UK names among the top 100 global infrastructure investors with combined assets 
of about €9bn. The largest investors on this list are USS, Lloyds Banking and BT Group. 
Pension funds 
There are no precise figures available on pension funds’ investments in infrastructure. In general, 
the asset allocation is still low, as one can deduct from the pieces of evidence available on 
unlisted or private investments in infrastructure. To start with the leading countries, Australian 
and large Canadian pension funds have been pioneers in this field since the 1990s and early 
2000s. The average asset allocation to unlisted (or private) infrastructure is estimated at 5-6% of 
assets in these two leading countries (Inderst and Della Croce 2013). In Europe, some larger 
pension funds started dedicated infrastructure investments in the mid-2000s, and the number of 
investors has been rising since. Other regions have followed.  
Willis Towers Watson (2016) found $127bn of global pension fund investments in infrastructure 
funds with the top 100 alternative managers. The OECD (2016) survey collected data from 99 
large pension funds and public pension reserve funds, 23 of which provided data on their 
infrastructure allocations. It revealed $74bn of unlisted infrastructure equity and $11bn of 
infrastructure debt investments. However, infrastructure assets were only about 1% of the asset 
allocation of the full universe of funds. 
Mercer (2016), a consultancy firm, surveyed 1100 institutional investors in 14 countries with 
total assets of €930bn. The survey is biased towards the UK investors, who held 56% of assets in 
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2016. 5% of investors had holdings in infrastructure with an average asset allocation of 4% 
among them. Large schemes are much more likely to invest in infrastructure than smaller ones. 
UK pension funds 
UK pension schemes own assets of about £2tn, i.e. over 100% of GDP. The majority of pension 
schemes investors (still) have little or no investments in this field, especially smaller ones. UBS 
(2015) shows an average infrastructure allocation of 1.5% by UK corporate and 1% by local 
authority schemes. The PLSA (2016) finds about 20% of a sample of 125 UK “defined benefit” 
(DB) funds invested in infrastructure, with an allocation of less than 2% of assets among them. 
Furthermore, it can be assumed that infrastructure constitutes only a minimal part of the rising 
number of “defined contribution” (DC) schemes. 
However, the UK pension funds activity has risen over the past few years. Data collected from 
Local Government Pension Schemes (LGPS) show that their infrastructure holdings have more 
than doubled from 148 in 2015 to 388 in 2016, with a market value up from £1.8bn to £4.5bn, 
i.e. about 2% of assets (Long 2016). 
In Preqin’s database, around 130 UK (private and public) pension funds are reported to be active 
in infrastructure (Preqin 2016b). The average asset allocation to infrastructure by the reporting 
funds is 3.6%; the target asset allocation is 4.8%. The largest schemes in this respect are USS 
(£3bn), BT (£1.7bn), Railways (£1.3bn) and the TfL Pension Fund (£0.4bn). 
Insurance companies 
UK insurance company assets are about £1.9tn (ABI 2015). Traditionally, insurers hardly had any 
investments in unlisted infrastructure assets. Across Europe, a volume of €11.7bn (based on 13 
European insurance companies’ survey responses) is reported for 2011, only a tiny fraction (of 
about 0.1%) of the €7.4tn of assets (Insurance Europe 2013). However, many European and UK 
insurers and their asset management subsidiaries have lately become more active, especially on 
the infrastructure debt side. Traditional bank loans have in some places been substituted by 
direct private loans from non-bank institutions. 
9.1 Direct investment and foreign investors 
The “Canadian model” of infrastructure investing has received much attention. It consists of 
taking direct stakes in infrastructure companies, internal asset management (or by controlled 
subsidiaries) and strong governance principles (Inderst and Della Croce 2013). It has been 
followed by large pension funds especially in Australia, the Netherlands, Northern Europe and 
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elsewhere. There are several examples of direct ownership such funds in the UK.25 With a few 
exceptions, UK institutional investors have joined this trend rather late. Several UK pension 
funds are known to hold equity stakes directly.26  
Direct investments are being undertaken by all sorts of other investors, such as SWFs, 
investment funds and wealth managers. Developers, contractors and industrial corporations 
have also become active in this space. They often co-invest as consortia, syndicates or in other 
forms of co-operation. A substantial part of direct investments come from abroad. Table 5 lists 
some examples.  
According to Preqin, over 60% of SWF now invest in infrastructure. They have increased their 
interests in UK infrastructure in recent years. The UK and the US were the leading destinations 
for direct SWF investments between 2007 and 2014 with a share of 16% each (TheCityUK 2015). 
For the most part, SWFs have historically been active in existing assets rather than new, 
greenfield projects.27 
Table 5: Examples of recent Non-EU Investment in UK Infrastructure 
  
Source: TheCityUK (2015) 
                                                     
25 For example, Canadian pension funds (OMERS, OTPP, CPP) invested in UK ports, water companies, 
telecom, airports, HS and others. Gatwick Airport has the private equity firm GIP as main shareholder, 
with several SWFs (Abu Dhabi) and pension funds as co-investors (US CalPERS, Australian Futures Fund, 
Korean National Pension Service). 
26 They include the BT Pension scheme in Thames Water, and the USS in Heathrow and the National Air 
Traffic Services. The Environment Agency pension fund invests via funds in in renewable energy and 
energy efficiency.  
27 There are examples of holdings of UK utility assets such as the China Investment Corporation (CIC) and 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority’s investments in Thames Water. In 2012, CIC also acquired a stake in 
Heathrow Airport. Safe Investment Company invested in Affinity Water in 2012 and in BP in 2010. The 
Singaporean GIC has investments in UK ports and water. (TheCityUK 2015, City of London 2013) 
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9.2 Barriers and challenges 
The general barriers and constraints in infrastructure investment for institutional investors, 
especially pension funds, have flagged in the past (e.g. Inderst (2009), Della Croce (2011), 
Panayiotou and Medda (2014)). There are constraints on the supply side (e.g. regulatory 
uncertainties, lack of suitable projects), demand side (e.g. investor resources and capability), and 
in the intermediation process (e.g. inappropriate, expensive fund vehicles). In the UK, one factor 
is the enormous segregation of the pensions system and the lack of scale of individual funds. 
The UK pension system works with “prudent person” principles, and does not have hard 
investment limits on asset classes (other than on portfolio concentration). The regulatory 
hurdles are relatively low in international comparison. Alonso et al. (2016) constructed an “Index 
of regulatory liberalization for the investment of pension funds in infrastructure”. The UK and 
Australia are in 6th place. Only Canada has less restrictive regulation among the G7+ countries. 
However, risk management has become tighter over the years in the face of the maturing 
membership, widespread underfunding of DB schemes, new accounting rules, and the 
introduction of The Pension Regulator and the Pension Protection Fund. Therefore, most 
pension funds have a preference for lower-risk brownfield assets and social PFI investments with 
public availability payments.  
Insurance companies in the UK have solvency rules to respect, and feel a strict regulatory corset. 
Here too is a preference for lower risk assets, especially investment grade infrastructure debt. 
Many insurers consider Solvency II regulation as a stumbling block for less liquid investments 
such as infrastructure debt. The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA) has softened the rules for certain categories of lower risk infrastructure assets (equity 
and debt, project and corporate) in 2015 and 2016. 
The list of potential risks for investors is long. Most UK investors have, so far, avoided greenfield 
infrastructure as they are concerned or unknowledgeable about development and construction 
risks. Lack of scale is symptomatic of the supply in social infrastructure, with a median value of 
PFI of less than £50m. Some investors are nervous about assets that are exposed to competitive 
conditions, or volatile demand, especially in transport (e.g. M6 toll road). Some famous headline 
failures are also seen as a warning signal.28 Political, regulatory and reputational risks are a 
general concern for trustees and boards everywhere.  
                                                     
28 There have been some prominent cases of transport projects that left their mark. In Australia, pension 
funds and other investors faced losses with the Cross City Tunnel. The Eurotunnel was an early example 
of a transport PPP in Europe that was costly to initial investors as a result of cost overrun, over-optimistic 
 
33 
 
Investors are learning about risk management and risk mitigation by the private sector in 
infrastructure. In addition, governments all over the world consider, and sometimes also 
introduce, different mechanisms for overcoming constraints and barriers to higher institutional 
investor involvement. They include fiscal incentives, capital pooling platforms and risk mitigation 
mechanisms in infrastructure and green investments (guarantees, insurances, credit 
enhancement, currency risk protection and other instruments) (OECD 2014b, OECD 2015a). 
In conclusion, UK institutional investors have traditionally provided substantial capital and 
liquidity to listed utility and telecom stocks. UK pension funds are increasingly investing in 
unlisted infrastructure but overall allocations are still at low levels. Insurance companies have 
lately become active in infrastructure debt. International investors, including large Canadian 
pension funds and SWFs, have taken substantial direct exposure in UK infrastructure assets. In 
general, most UK investors prefer lower-risk assets, and many are nervous about risks specific to 
infrastructure, especially construction and political risks. 
10 UK infrastructure policies 
Despite wide-ranging privatisation, the UK government still plays a key role in infrastructure in 
several ways, e.g. by setting the national policy framework, shaping the regulatory system, 
providing funding, privatising assets, procuring projects, and by acting as the authority in 
licensing and concession regimes and as a partner in PPPs. Some observers see a “return of the 
state” in UK infrastructure in the form of increasing subsidies, guarantees and state ownership 
(e.g. Helm 2013).  
Since the financial crisis, infrastructure investment has indeed moved up the political agenda in 
various steps with many announcements. The UK government has tried a more systematic 
approach with new plans and institutions to overcome the “institutional gap” in making strategic 
decisions in UK infrastructure policy (e.g. Coelho and Dellepiane 2016).29 Given the precarious 
situation of the public deficit, a core objective is to incentivise higher long-term private capital 
flows into infrastructure. However, the state can also be an impediment for more private capital 
                                                                                                                                                                             
revenue projections and financial leverage (Flyvbjerg 2009). It paid the first dividend in 2009, and it still 
has yet to carry the numbers of passengers predicted, despite some 325m passengers having passed 
through it during the past two decades (The Economist 2014). 
29 “The evidence reviewed in this paper suggests there are important problems in the way the UK makes 
strategic infrastructure decisions. These include short-sightedness; lack of cross-party agreement which 
exposes private investors to high levels of policy risk; deficiencies in the development of the evidence 
base that underpins projects with cross-party support; and failure to secure public consent, which often 
leads to political procrastination.” (Coelho and Dellepiane 2016, p. 18f) 
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investment in power stations, airports and roads, e.g. by excessive planning restrictions and 
other regulations (IEA 2016). 
In 2010, Infrastructure UK was created as a division of HM Treasury, to advise the Government 
on long-term infrastructure planning, and facilitate private sector investment in projects. Given 
the relatively high cost of building infrastructure in the UK, an Infrastructure Cost Review was 
undertaken that found potential savings of £2-3bn a year. In 2016, Infrastructure UK was merged 
with the Major Projects Authority (MPA) to form the new Infrastructure and Projects Authority 
(IPA). It supports project development and delivery across the whole of government. 
A National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) was set up in 2015 to provide the government with 
impartial, expert advice on major infrastructure challenges and to identify long-term 
infrastructure needs of the country. It was established as an Executive Agency of HM Treasury in 
early 2017 but should act independently (NIC 2017). In 2016, the NIC published reports on High 
Speed North, Smart Power, London Transport, a Cambridge-Oxford corridor and 5G 
telecommunications. Once in every Parliament, it has to produce a National Infrastructure 
Assessment, including the economic (but not social) infrastructure needs for the next 30 years. 
The first report is expected in 2018. 
Upgrading infrastructure is also an important part of a “new industrial strategy” to improve 
productivity and growth across the whole country.30 2016 has seen further commitments by the 
UK government, claiming that “central government economic infrastructure investment will now 
rise by almost 60 per cent between 16/17 (£14 billion) and 20/21 (£22 billion)” (HM Government 
2017). Furthermore, the NIC has been advised to plan on the basis that government 
infrastructure spending will be between 1 and 1.2% of GDP between 2020 and 2050.  
An independent body, the National Audit Office (NAO), scrutinises individual public spending 
decisions on behalf of the UK Parliament, and makes policy recommendations. 
10.1 The National Infrastructure Plan 
The latest pipeline of the National Infrastructure Plan (HM Treasury 2016c) combines and 
consolidates the previously separated infrastructure pipeline with the construction pipeline. In 
terms of value, the pipeline is concentrated in the energy (around 41% incl. oil & gas) and 
                                                     
30 “There has been an historic lack of clear long-term thinking in the Government’s approach to national 
infrastructure strategy – in how we join up at a national level, and in a way that more consistently 
considers the interdependencies of infrastructure sectors. This has contributed to the disjointed provision 
of infrastructure and a legacy of underinvestment.” (HM Government 2017, p. 51-52) 
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transport sectors (28%). 15% goes into utilities (incl. regulated water, electricity and gas 
distribution and transmission) and 3% into communication (Table 6). 
Over 60% of the projects and programmes in the pipeline (excluding oil & gas) are in 
construction. The “Priorities to 2020/21” list includes prominent projects such the High Speed 2, 
Crossrail 2, Hinckley Point C nuclear power and the Thames Tideway Tunnel sewer. Energy 
projects appear to be particularly back-loaded, due to three planned nuclear power stations with 
a value of £46bn, and other “post 2020 spend” on electricity generation of £69bn. 
Social sectors, newly added in 2016, amount to £50bn, i.e. around 10% of the pipeline value, of 
which 3% in housing & regeneration, 4% in education, 3% in defence and less than 1% in health. 
The latest additions in 2016 are £2.6bn transport improvements out of a £23bn National 
Productivity Investment Fund (NPIF), a new £2.3bn Housing Infrastructure Fund and a new 
£0.4bn Digital Infrastructure Investment Fund. 
Table 6: National Infrastructure and Construction Pipeline (by sector) 
  
Source: HM Treasury (2016c) 
Financing the infrastructure pipeline 
About 39% of the pipeline (£191bn) will be financed by the public sector, 55% by the private 
sector (£272bn) and 6% via a PPP (£27bn) (HM Treasury 2016b). For the shorter term plans up to 
2021, the percentages are 43% public, 51% private and 8% PPP. The public share is considerably 
higher than projections in the earlier years (e.g. 21% in the NIP 2014). This is due to the 
consolidation of the construction pipeline, the inclusion of social infrastructure, the additional 
government spending plans, and other changes. 
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The future sources of finance vary considerably across sectors (Figure 8). Utilities, waste, airports 
and ports are expected to be fully private, energy and communications predominately private. 
On the other hand, road and rail, social infrastructure, flood defences and science & research are 
expected to be mostly publicly financed. (These figures for social infrastructure do not yet 
include housing and regeneration). 
Figures 8: Pipeline by sector and financing source 
 
Source: HM Treasury (2016b) 
Traditional finance has a 60% share of the pipeline, and the rest “more complex project-finance 
or structured-finance solutions” (HM Treasury 2013). The UK government expects an increasing 
amount to be financed “off balance sheet” in project finance, especially in energy generation, 
interconnection, offshore transmission, and some large scale transport projects. In the 2016 
NIDP, the regulated sectors make up just over 20% of the total pipeline with planned 
investments of £107bn. Network rail, electricity transmission and distribution as well as water 
should take the largest chunks of regulated capital. 
Regional perspective and devolution 
The National Infrastructure Plans also includes a regional perspective. The UK is a unitary state 
but in three of the twelve regions there is “devolution” of some powers to a subnational 
government. The NIDP covers infrastructure across the UK where it is not a devolved 
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responsibility to the Northern Ireland Assembly, Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly. The 
arrangements are complex and vary across regions and sectors. For example, responsibility for 
investment in roads infrastructure is fully devolved; other sectors have different splits of 
responsibilities. Devolved administrations produce their own infrastructure plan (e.g. The 
Scottish Government 2015, Welsh Government 2012, Northern Ireland Executive 2012). 
London is another exception because it has greater powers than other local authorities, e.g. no 
other authority has an entity similar to Transport for London. The NIDP 2016 talks about a 
“devolution revolution currently underway including in London, the Northern Powerhouse, and 
the Midlands Engine” (HM Treasury 2016a, p. 10). Local governments play an important role in 
the provision of infrastructure investment and services. They contribute more to gross fixed 
capital formation than the central government (Local Government Group 2010). 
10.2 PF2 and Scotland’s NPD 
Opinions on PFI were polarized from the beginning. Some see it as a reference model for the 
world31. Many countries around the world certainly looked at the UK experience (see, e.g., Blanc-
Brude 2012, RICS 2013). Others dislike PFI, and PPPs in general, for all sorts of reasons, ranging 
from the technical to the ideological. 
PFI was criticized for many reasons: for being too expensive, too opaque, too slow and too 
inflexible. According to critics, the private sector could make windfall gains while the risk transfer 
and potential future liabilities for the public sector were unclear.32 Some projects were 
unsuitable for PFI while there was an incentive to offload them from the public books. “Value for 
money” was not good enough for the taxpayers (Reform 2009, ACE 2012, Hall 2015, OECD 
2015c).33 
After 2010, the new government reviewed PFI (including a report by the NAO (2011), and set out 
a modified approach - called PF2 - in 2012 (HM Treasury 2012b). PF2 tries to address the 
criticisms with a number of changes, including: 
                                                     
31 “The UK developed PFI model is used as a reference around the world: the UK has led the world in the 
development of PFI contracts…Throughout the EU, governments are setting up private finance units, 
based on the UK.” (HM Treasury 2008) 
32 The Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) estimated that the present value of obligations for future PFI 
payments is £190bn, or 2.1% of GDP; £114 resting with central government, £72bn with local authorities 
and £4bn with public corporations (OBR 2016). 
33 Vecchi et al. (2013) analysed the cost-efficiency of Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) in the UK health 
sector facilities. Expected returns by the private sector exceed the underlying cost of capital by far (about 
9% on average), despite the “low risk” nature of availability-based payments by the public sector. 
38 
 
- the public sector will keep a minority equity stake 
- third party funding competitions for a portion of equity 
- debt solutions other than bank loans should be considered  
- procurement is to be cheaper and faster, with a maximum duration of 18 months 
- standardised documentation in the procurement process 
- service contracts should be more flexible (making renegotiation easier) 
- measures to improve transparency for both public and private partners. 
However, some risks are transferred back to the public sector, and most of PF2 is still outside the 
normal public accounts. 
The uptake of PF2 has so far been slow. 46 schools in the £4.4bn Priority Schools Building 
Programme (PSBP) are being delivered via PF2. The £340m PF2 Midland Metropolitan Hospital 
should be opened in 2018. The government announced the development of a new pipeline of 
projects that are suitable for delivery through PF2 (HM Treasury 2016b). 
Scotland developed an alternative to PFI, the non-profit distributing (NPD) model (Box 2). 
Box 2: Scotland’s and Wales’ NPD model 
Scotland produced the first Infrastructure Investment Plan in the country in 2008, with updates 
in 2011, 2013 and 2015 (The Scottish Government 2015). The Scottish Futures Trust (SFT) was 
established in 2008 to help ensure better value for taxpayers’ money in the delivery of public 
infrastructure projects. SFT announced a £3.5bn pipeline of revenue-financed infrastructure 
projects to 2020. 
In 2010, the Scottish Government introduced a new Non-Profit Distributing (NPD) model as an 
alternative to the traditional PFI model. It is being used to fund projects in three main sectors – 
further education, health and transport. The NPD model aims to eliminate uncapped equity 
returns and limit returns to a reasonable rate set through competition. 
Wales published its own infrastructure plan in 2012 (Welsh Government 2012). In 2014, the NPD 
model was adopted by the devolved government for Wales with a £500bn schools programme. 
The 2016 pipeline comprised 365 investments across both public and private sectors, including in 
the non-devolved areas of rail and energy, with a value of more than £40bn. 
10.3 Infrastructure financing initiatives 
Many projects stalled following the financial crisis and recession. The UK Government started a 
series of infrastructure financing initiatives, including risk mitigation and capital pooling schemes 
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for institutional investors, to revive infrastructure investment, especially in new and climate 
change-related projects.  
The NAO (2015a) mentions several other mechanisms to support private financing of public 
assets that change the risk allocation between the private sector, taxpayer and consumer:  
 Traffic and volume guarantees (e.g. Mersey Gateway Bridge 2014) 
 Contracts for Difference (CfDs) (introduced as part of the Electricity Market Reform 2013)  
 Direct lending by government departments 
 Debt-issuance by government-owned companies (such as Network Rail) 
 Government-owned financial institutions (such as the GIB) 
 Financial guarantees (such as the UKGS). 
UK Guarantees Scheme 
A four-year UK Guarantees Scheme (UKGS) of £40bn was launched in 2012 to encourage private 
investment in UK infrastructure. Through this scheme, the UK Government gives guarantees for 
debt investors in qualified projects during the construction and post-construction phase. This is 
effectively swapping project risk for sovereign risk. The terms are “commercial”; the sponsor is 
charged a fee in line with market rates and project risk. It aims at avoiding “crowding-out” 
commercial finance. The UKGS was initially planned to run until 2014, and later extended to 
2016, 2021 and then to 2026. 
UKGS is available for a broad range of economic and social infrastructure sectors, including 
housing. By the end of 2016, nine guarantees were issued worth £1.8bn with a total capital value 
of projects of £4bn (£750m of which for London’s Northern Line extension). Three more 
guarantees were approved. UKGS has also supported another 24 pre-qualified projects to reach 
financial close by providing advice, support or commitment without ultimately providing a 
guarantee (HM Treasury 2016b). 
In 2015, the National Audit Office undertook a review of the UKGS at an early stage and gave 
several recommendations, especially on a more rigorous assessment that guarantees are really 
needed. It found that “the Scheme provides stronger protection to lenders than comparable 
European state schemes, which provide credit enhancement but not a full sovereign guarantee 
of principal and interest.” (NAO 2015b, p. 5) 
Green Investment Bank 
In 2012, the Green Investment Bank (GIB) was set up and capitalized with public funds. The UK 
Government was the sole shareholder with committed funding of £3.8bn. The GIB invests “on a 
commercial basis” in innovative, environmentally friendly projects where there is a lack of 
40 
 
sufficient support from private markets. It also aims at “crowding in” additional finance from 
private investors. The focus is initially on three sectors: offshore wind, waste and bioenergy, 
energy efficiency. 
By the end of 2016, GIB had committed £2.8bn to 83 green infrastructure projects and funds, 
mobilising over £8bn of private capital. GIB established an Offshore Wind Fund in 2014, which 
raised over £1bn, and invested in five operational wind farms, making it the largest renewable 
fund in the UK. Investors include UK pension funds and several other international asset owners. 
In April 2017, the GIB was privatised and sold to Macquarie Bank for £2.3bn. 
Other policy interventions 
There are further UK government interventions and initiatives in the area of green investment, 
social infrastructure, taxation and other areas. Some examples include: 
 A range of policy mechanisms to support the transition to a clean energy system, including 
Contracts for Difference (CfDs) for low-carbon energy generation. CfDs set a fixed price for 
low-carbon (including nuclear) electricity generators. These are long-term, legally-binding 
agreements that should stabilise prices, and help reduce risk and lower the cost of capital.  
 Among the social infrastructure initiatives, the Priority School Building Programme (PSBP) by 
the Education Funding Agency was launched to improve the condition of the schools most in 
need of urgent repair. There are two phases of the programme covering a total of 537 
schools, 46 of which use private finance (all in phase 1) and the rest use capital grants. 
 In 2016, some local authorities were given the power to raise business rates by a new 
“infrastructure supplement” of maximum 2% to be used for local infrastructure projects. 
 Project-specific support packages; an example of which is the Thames Tideway Tunnel.34 
Institutional investor initiatives 
There are “huge infrastructure demands and hungry institutional funds – link them” (Heseltine 
2012). Several other institutional investor related initiatives have emerged.  
                                                     
34 The £4.2bn project was structured as a hybrid between project financing and utility financing, with a 
custom-made regulatory framework providing revenues from the start of construction, and a bespoke 
government support package (GSP) was structured to cover high impact, low probability risks. The GSP 
includes contingent equity, debt and insurance support in specific circumstances. This has allowed the 
TTT project to successfully raise around £1.3bn of equity, a £1bn revolving loan facility, a £700m EIB loan 
and £450m index-linked forward purchase bonds. 
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An Insurers’ Infrastructure Investment Forum was set up by the UK Government to promote an 
increased engagement in infrastructure by UK insurance companies. In December 2013, six 
insurers – Aviva, Friends Life, Legal & General, Prudential, Scottish Widows and Standard Life – 
said they would work alongside partners with the aim of delivering £25bn of investment in UK 
infrastructure in the next five years. By the end of 2015, they had invested over £5bn in 
infrastructure projects (HM Treasury 2016a). 
The Pension Infrastructure Platform (PIP) has been in development since 2011, following a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government and UK pension funds. Signatories 
included the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the Pension Protection Fund and a 
group of public and private pension schemes (three of the ten original investors dropped out in 
the early stages). PIP is a not-for-profit entity that is formally independent of the Government. 
PIP should facilitate UK pension funds, especially smaller ones, to invest more in UK 
infrastructure assets. It aims to pool pension assets and invest them (directly or indirectly) in 
infrastructure projects, with a view to generating long-dated, inflation-linked returns of the 
order of RPI inflation plus 2-5%, with relatively low leverage and low risk. It should operate on a 
low cost basis (0.5% fee).  
A size of £20bn over ten years had been envisaged initially. The target is currently to raise £2bn 
of capital from UK pension funds. The first PIP fund started in 2013/4 with Dalmore Capital as 
investment manager in the “secondary market” and a portfolio of 41 PFI projects, mostly in 
hospitals and schools. At the end of 2016, PIP had established three funds, with combined 
commitments of over £1bn, including a solar PV fund with Aviva, and a multi-strategy 
infrastructure fund with two different risk profiles and a low minimum investment hurdle. 
In 2015, the government called for proposals to merge assets of the 89 existing local government 
pension schemes (LGPS) (about £220bn) into six pools to deliver efficiencies, cost savings and 
develop their capacity and capability to be major infrastructure investors. The “British Wealth 
Funds” should contain at least £25bn of scheme assets each. The stated ambition of the pools 
for infrastructure investment is in the range 5-10% of assets over the long term. 
In the meantime, increased collaboration has started, e.g. with the formation of the Local 
Pensions Partnership (LPP) by two LGPS. More specifically on infrastructure, in 2015, two large 
public funds, Greater Manchester Pension Fund and London Pensions Fund Authority, started an 
infrastructure joint venture, GLIL, with a joint allocation of £500bn to invest in UK infrastructure 
projects. It was later joined by three more LGPS, West Yorkshire, Merseyside and Lancashire 
County, to increase the pool to £1.3bn. 
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Municipal Bonds 
The municipal bonds market is still very small in the UK. Following examples in other countries, 
the UK Municipal Bonds Agency was founded in 2014 to help local councils to finance their 
investment in projects including infrastructure and housing. It is a public limited company, 
owned by local councils and the Local Government Association. It aims at diversifying the 
financing sources of local authorities and reducing financing costs. Currently, 75% of local 
authority borrowing comes from the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB), part of the Debt 
Management Office (DMO).  
European institutions and initiatives 
Furthermore, and this is often overlooked, there are international initiatives at work in the UK, 
most importantly from EU institutions. The European Investment Bank (EIB) has been a 
significant source of finance for UK infrastructure projects. The EIB increased lending to the UK 
to a record £5.6bn in 2015 and £5.5bn in 2016 (about 0.3% of GDP), mostly in infrastructure and 
environment. EIB investments accumulated to about £25bn over the last five years, and over 
£100bn since 1973. 
The EIB is owned by the 28 member states of the EU with a subscribed capital of €243bn of 
which €21bn is paid in. The UK has a share of 16%, i.e. €3.4bn paid in. It continued to approve 
and sign financing deals with UK projects after the EU referendum 2016 (including a £750m loan 
to National Grid and a £400m loan to Anglian Water). 
Following the Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative, the European Commission announced the 
Investment Plan for Europe (“Juncker-Plan”) at the end of 2014. It is intended to facilitate 
€315bn of investments, especially in infrastructure and for SMEs. Part of the plan is the 
European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) with a €16bn guarantee from the EU budget, 
complemented by a €5bn allocation of the EIB’s own capital. 
 In 2016, the Commission proposed to increase the guarantees to €26bn and €7.5bn 
respectively, in order to mobilize more private capital with a multiplier of 15, and an overall 
investment target over €500bn.35 By the end of 2016, the UK was third largest beneficiary of EFSI 
funds (behind Italy and France), i.e. €2.9bn for 19 infrastructure and innovation projects, 
including the smart meters roll-out, the Midland Metropolitan Hospital and two windfarms. 
                                                     
35 EFSI has been integrated into the EIB Group. Projects supported by EFSI are subject to the normal EIB 
project cycle and governance. However, it has the specific objective of addressing the market failure in 
risk-taking which hinders investment in Europe, and it should increase the volume of higher risk projects 
supported by the EIB Group. 
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The LGTT Cooperation agreement, signed in January 2008, aims to increase the participation of 
private sector involvement in the financing of Trans-European Transport Network Infrastructure 
(TEN-T). In the UK, the London Gateway Port (TEN) was closed with the help of LGTT in 2011. 
In 2009, the EU adopted the EU 2020 climate and energy package with some binding legislation 
that sets three key targets: 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels), 20% of EU 
energy from renewables (plus 10% share of renewables in the transport sector) and 20% 
improvement in energy efficiency by 2020. In 2014, these targets were raised and extended to 
40%, 27% and 27% respectively. The UK Climate Change Act 2008 sets a legal framework for the 
UK to cut greenhouse gas emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. 
In summary, the UK governments have undertaken various steps to turn around infrastructure 
investment in recent years, including National Infrastructure Plans and project pipelines. New 
institutions and policy instruments were set up, as well as a reformed PPP model (PF2). Given 
the difficult state of public finances, a core objective remains to facilitate more long-term private 
capital flows into infrastructure. A number of financing initiatives have been started, including a 
guarantee scheme, a green investment bank, and new platforms for institutional investors. Some 
initiatives have moved faster than others. Furthermore, European institutions and initiatives 
have provided important flows of finance for the development of UK infrastructure. 
11 Policy recommendations 
OECD recommendations 
In its recommendations for the UK, the OECD has identified better infrastructure, especially 
transport infrastructure, as key priority for policy reforms year by year. Low investment in public 
infrastructure has contributed to congestion, hampering productivity. Key recommendations 
include (OECD 2015b, Pisu et al. 2015, Égert et al. 2009, ITF 2017): 
 further enhancement of long-term infrastructure strategy and planning 
 improvements of roads by introducing user-paid tolls, and of railways by ensuring the 
arms-length responsibility for awarding rail franchises 
 addressing supply constraints in energy; clarification of the Electricity Market Reform and 
climate change policies 
 more investment in digital infrastructure to bridge the regional digital divide 
 development of public-private partnerships (PPP) and public guarantees for privately 
financed infrastructure projects 
 recording PPP assets and liabilities in the government fiscal accounts. 
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Further recommendations 
In the discussions around the new direction of UK policy since the financial crisis and the EU 
referendum, many additional reform measures for funding and financing infrastructure have 
been proposed from different sides. A (non-exhaustive) list of major changes would include: 
 extensive user charges for roads36 
 re-nationalization of infrastructure (especially rail, water)37 
 full privatisation of railway 
 more radical interventions in the energy sector (e.g. competition, price caps, capacity)  
 major reforms to increase the housing stock, including social housing  
 a national investment, infrastructure or development bank (similar to KfW in Germany, 
CDC in France, CDP in Italy, etc.) (e.g. LSE 2013) 
 credit enhancement for greenfield projects with UK project or “infrastructure bonds”  
 “asset recycling” (i.e. more privatisation of existing infrastructure assets to the private 
sector, where the funds are being used for building new infrastructure) 
 extension of the regulated asset base model (RAB) to other sectors  
 changes to regulatory regimes for investors and banks (e.g. Solvency II, Basel III) 
 changes to the tax regime to support infrastructure investments 
 a full national balance sheet, including the infrastructure capital stock, depreciation and 
investment flows (new, upgrade, maintenance). 
12 Summary and conclusions 
The UK has been a leading country for private capital investments in infrastructure for several 
decades. It had been pioneering widespread privatisations of utilities in the 1980s, from which 
the UK model of “regulated asset base” (RAB) evolved. It has also developed substantial 
experience in PPPs since the 1990s, especially in the form of the PFI model for social 
infrastructure. At the same time, the country gained a reputation for chronic under-investment 
and, in parts, also for poor infrastructure, especially in transport. Since the financial crisis and 
                                                     
36 “Why is it that other infrastructure – for example, water – is funded by private sector capital through 
privately owned, independently regulated utilities, but roads in Britain still call on the public finances for 
funding?” (Speech by Prime Minister David Cameron 19 December 2012) 
37 “I never envisaged that when it came to nationalising I would be outdone by a Conservative Chancellor. 
The only difference between us is that I would like to bring services like rail back into the ownership of 
the British people but the Chancellor wants to sell them to the People’s Republic of China.” (Speech by 
Shadow Chancellor  John McDonnell, 24 November 2015) 
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recession in 2007-2009, infrastructure has moved to the core of the political discussion, leading 
to several attempts to spur more investments – so far with mixed success. 
Advanced economies have experienced a downward trend in fixed capital investment since the 
1970s. The UK has been hovering around the bottom end of its peer countries in terms of 
infrastructure investment, with a comparatively low 2.5-2.8% of GDP spent on economic 
infrastructure and around 1% on social infrastructure. There has been a dramatic shift from 
public to private infrastructure construction spending over the last three decades but this may 
have come to a halt. 
The UK’s future economic infrastructure needs are (conservatively) estimated to be somewhat 
higher in future (i.e. to increase to 3-3.5% of GDP, or £55-65bn per annum). Social infrastructure 
could need another 1-1.5% of GDP, or £20-25bn per annum. Additional requirements, e.g. for 
climate change policies or higher social targets, would come on top of that.  
Quality assessments of the infrastructure in the UK give a mixed picture. National surveys rate 
most of UK infrastructure rather poorly, especially in transport. In international surveys, the 
country is seen in the mid-field of comparable economies with a great variation across sectors. In 
contrast, the UK is widely considered as an attractive investment target. 
The ownership of UK’s infrastructure is remarkably diverse. Only about one third of it is left in 
public hands, most notably the roads. Foreign investors own about 40% of economic 
infrastructure although this varies widely across sectors. The UK has been very open for FDI. 
Specialist investors such as SWFs, infrastructure, private equity and pension funds have 
increased their exposures in recent times.  
An estimated 70% of UK infrastructure is financed by private capital. Traditional corporate 
finance is the dominant force; much of it is regulated by independent regulators. Listed 
companies play an important role for infrastructure investment. In international comparison, 
one can note a strong presence of privatised utility and telecom stocks (weighting of nearly 10% 
on the LSE) while transport and social infrastructure are nearly absent. 
The UK also has an above-average market share of project finance deals (about 1-2% of GDP) 
within Europe and worldwide. PPPs worldwide suffered under the financial crisis and recession. 
In the UK, policy changes also contributed to the setback. UK PFI volumes have fallen back from 
about 0.5% of GDP in 2006 to less than 0.1%. The UK’s share of Europe’s PPP volumes has 
declined to about 30%, i.e. 0.2% of GDP. Transport PPPs play a smaller role in the UK than on the 
Continent. The EU and UK market for project bonds has revived since 2013 but is still very small. 
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Private equity investments by specialist infrastructure funds have become an increasingly 
important financing vehicle for infrastructure projects. The UK obtains about half of European 
and around one fifth of the global deals, with a volume of 1-2% of GDP. It has a particularly 
strong presence in social infrastructure and green energy. More recently, infrastructure debt 
investing has become more popular especially by insurance companies.  
UK institutional investors have traditionally provided substantial capital and liquidity to listed 
utility and telecom stocks. UK pension funds are increasingly investing in unlisted infrastructure 
but overall allocations are still at low levels. International investors, including large Canadian 
pension funds and SWFs, have taken substantial direct exposure in UK infrastructure assets. 
Most UK investors prefer lower-risk assets, and many are nervous about risks specific to 
infrastructure, especially construction, regulatory and political risks. 
Successive UK governments have undertaken various steps to turn around infrastructure 
investment in recent years, including “National Infrastructure Plans” and project pipelines, as 
well as new institutions and policy instruments, and a reformed PPP model (PF2). 
Given very tight public budgets, a core objective remains to facilitate more long-term private 
capital flows into infrastructure. A number of financing initiatives have been started, including a 
guarantee scheme, a green investment bank, and new platforms for institutional investors. Some 
initiatives have moved faster than others. Often overlooked, European institutions and initiatives 
have provided important flows of finance for the development of UK infrastructure. 
The UK has a strong presence in the global infrastructure, project finance, green bond and PPP 
market. London is also one of the main markets for listed infrastructure funds, and an 
investment centre with a high share of headquarters of the financial industry involved in 
infrastructure. 
12.1 The UK in international comparison 
In the international context, the investment and financing of UK infrastructure in the UK can 
today be characterized in the following way: 
1. Britain used to be a country of great industrial, engineering and infrastructure building 
history. However, it has experienced decades of relatively weak public investment, and its 
“creaky infrastructure” (The Economist) may hinder future growth prospects and 
competitiveness. 
2. The country’s infrastructure is highly (but not uniformly) privatised, with about 70% in 
private and 40% in foreign hands today. Given the poor outlook for public finances, it will 
remain highly dependent on private capital for the financing of infrastructure. 
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3. There is long experience in terms of regulating privatised utilities with independent 
institutions. The UK model “regulated asset base” model has been adjusted over time.  
4. The UK is also one of the countries with the highest expertise in developing PPPs, especially 
in social infrastructure. However, the UK model of PFI was halted, reviewed and replaced by 
PF2 with limited success, so far. 
5. Attempts to find relief for the “housing crisis” have shown little success, especially in social 
and affordable housing where the jobs are. 
6. Infrastructure policies have been considered as comparatively predictable in the 
international context. This despite major shifts and sporadic interventions that have occurred 
over time, e.g. in transport (especially the running of rail networks) and energy (including 
renewable energy and climate policies). 
7. The policy attention has been swinging between economic and social infrastructure over the 
years. As many other countries post financial crisis, the UK government has tried a more 
systematic approach with infrastructure plans, project pipelines, new institutions and 
financing initiatives. It is early days for an assessment. 
8. Most domestic institutional investors have traditionally been keen investors in listed utility 
stocks and bonds but have been relatively late in seeking investment opportunities in the 
unlisted market sector, especially for greenfield projects. 
9. The country has, so far, been seen as one of the most attractive investment targets by 
international investors. This is mainly due to an open, investor-friendly environment with 
clear property rights, a working judiciary system, and a relatively stable political framework. 
10. London is a major global centre of the financial industry, also for infrastructure and green 
finance, not the least helped by the access to the common European market. 
12.2 Lessons for investors and policy makers 
Different countries have different approaches to the organization of their infrastructure 
investment, and the attraction of private and foreign capital for it. There are useful lessons to be 
learnt from the UK for policy makers, asset owners and the financial industry, in the UK and 
other countries. 
Major positive lessons from the UK experience include: 
 Importance of a stable political system and macro economy 
 Solid institutional and legal environment, clear property rights  
 Highly developed capital markets, with a strong and diverse investor base 
 Open borders for overseas infrastructure developers, operators and investors 
 Strong private sector involvement in infrastructure, both via privatisations and PPPs 
 Proven regulatory system for utilities, telecoms, and other infrastructure sectors 
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 Long experience with PPPs, especially in social infrastructure with availability payments; 
PPPs in particular require time and a high degree of trust to succeed.  
 Financial centre with high private sector capacity and international expertise. 
There are also lessons learnt the hard way in the UK, and there are warning signals on the 
horizon: 
 Long-term decline in public infrastructure investment, and its negative effects on the 
infrastructure capital stock, the economy and society 
 Connected to this, also loss of capabilities in design and implementation of infrastructure 
policies in central and local government 
 “Shadow accounting” for PPPs that is counterproductive longer-term 
 A major intermediation issue between investor needs (for low-risk, operating, brownfield 
assets) and the financing needs for new, higher-risk, greenfield projects 
 A fragmented pension scene (with “de-risking”, shifting to DC, and with weak governance 
structures) that is long overdue for consolidation 
 Policy inconsistencies (e.g. between prudential regulation of investors, and the quest for 
long-term investment in infrastructure) 
 Policy reversals (e.g. rail, PFI, energy policies, Brexit) and policy delays (e.g. airports) 
 Questions over EU market access (and beyond), standards, regulations and connections; 
uncertainties over openness of the country, not the least for skilled people 
 Currency volatility 
 Future of the political system and the country’s constitution. 
In a nutshell, the UK has for some time been living on the combination of an ageing 
infrastructure, weak spending by the state (and taxpayers) and strong private sector 
involvement in infrastructure finance. The country’s creaky infrastructure needs more 
investment when public budgets are already stretched. The question is whether private capital 
will be as easily available in future as in the past, especially from trusting institutional and 
foreign investors. 
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